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Policy Analysis in Perspective 
The quantitative approach to policy analysis has been a dominating feature 
in decision theory since the early works of Tinbergen (1956) and Theil 
(1968). Operations research has paved the way for the use of models in 
economie, environmental and energy policy problems, even on a global 
scale. Especially programming models have become very popular in the 
area of planning and policy analysis. 
The use of such models and techniques however, has also met strong 
resistance due to the stringent assumptions underlying such advanced 
mathematical tools (apart from the complexity of these models). Usual 
assumptions regarding mathematical models for planning policy analysis 
are : 
- the existence of a single clearly identifiable and unambiguous decision 
unit or policy unit which is able to steer the whole system concerned; 
in a muiti-personsdecision framework, the impacts of the successive 
decision-makers involved can be precisely assessed either by defining 
an aggregate decision rule (by way of vating, e.g.) or by estimating 
the relative power influence of the individuals or sub-groups (see 
for instance, Blair (1979), Saaty (1977) and Shapley and Shubik (1954) ); 
- the objective(s) and policy criteria relevant for the planning problem 
concerned, are exactly known (including their mutual trade-offs); 
- spatial, social and intergenerational impacts of decisions to be made 
may be either neglected or assessed accurately via a spatial, social 
or dynamic distribution systems model; 
- equity and distribution problems (between regions, groups or genera-
tions) can be taken into account by means of the policy objectives and 
the structure of the systems model at hand; 
the complex relationship between policy measures (instruments) and 
policy objectives (targets) are precisely known via an operational 
economie model describing the various relevant impacts; 
the technical, institutional, social and economie side-conditions of the 
system concerned are also precisely known and can be specified in an 
operational way (by means of constraints, e.g.); 
the time trajectory of all variables of the system within a reasonable 
time horizon can be computed precisely; 
- when the state of a system is characterized by uncertainty (for instance, 
due to stochastic variables), the probability distribution of the 
stochastic elements is known, so that probability inferences can be drawn. 
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It is clear that in the practice of decision-making, the abovementioned 
conditions are hardly fulfilled, so that the determination of the optimal 
state of the system at hand is often an illusion. Consequently, tradi-
tional optimization models are increasingly receiving a very modest' 
position in modern policy analysis. The attention of policy-makers appears 
to shift from optimality analyses towards impact analyses, effectiveness 
analyses and strategie decision analyses. In these analyses, much more 
emphasis is placed on effects of policy measures, on shifts in social 
objectives, and on conflict management and compromise principles. 
In several recent publications, it has been stated that modern policy analyses 
have to be multidimensional in nature (see Nijkamp 1979, Nijkamp and Spronk, 
1981, and Rietveld, 1980), as they have to take into account the existence 
of a wide variety of social interests, decision groups and policy structures. 
Such a broader view of policy analysis and policy processes requires an 
integrative framework for judging alternative policy options within a feasible 
decision space. Instead of designing optimizing systems, in recent policy 
analyses (Nijkamp, 1980) much more emphasis has been put on rationalizing 
systems by providing relevant information, by revealing conflicts among 
ohjectives or groups, by assessing trade-offs among different choice possibili-
ties, by gauging the distributive impacts of policy measures, by identifying 
efficiënt (non-dominated) solutions, by designing suitable and relevant methods 
for policy evaluation, and by introducing learning principles. The current 
interest in interactive multidimensional programming models for policy analysis 
demonstrated clearly the new trends in designing and employing modern formal 
tools for decision-making. This issue will be further discussed in sub-
sequent sections. 
2. Elements of Policy Analysis 
In the light of the abovementioned trends in policy analysis, in general, 
the following elements may be distinguished in setting up a policy analysis: 
- the identification of policy objectives for the system concerned and of 
related judgement criteria for policy measures or instruments; 
- the identification of all feasible alternative choice possibilities which 
are considered to be relevant for the policy problems in question; 
- the assessment of all foreseeable and expected impacts of policy measures 
(or policy choices) upon the abovementioned objectives and criteria 
(for instance, by means of a formal structural model or a comprehensive 
impact system); 
- the identification of interest groups and/or decision groups associated 
with the policy problem in question, as well as the identification or 
assessment of conflicts among diverging priorities; 
- the assessment of policy priorities and/or weights attached by policy-
makers to effects of measures taken by them; 
- the development of appropriate evaluation methods and procedures (based on 
learning principles or strategie choice principles, e.g.); 
- the treatment of information during the imp1ementation stage of a policy 
plan so as to get insight into the sensitivities and/or shortcomings of 
the policy impact analyses used; 
- an ex post evaluation of the actual policy decisions, their impacts and 
the role of the policy analysis concerned arriving at these decisions. 
It should be noted that in practice, many of these elements cannot be 
realized, so that policy analyses usually have a partial nature. Given the 
abovementioned remarks about policy analysis, the following criteria may be 
specified for a meaningful and practical policy analysis: 
- it should be able to assess the effects of decisions or measures to be 
taken on policy objectives and/or criteria of the systems at hand; 
- it should provide a complete picture of relevant policy objectives, so 
that direct and indirect, intended and unintended impacts are included; 
- it should reflect the variety and multidimensionality of the components 
of the system concerned; 
- it should be flexible, so that the policy analysis can easily be adjusted 
to new circumstances or to new information; 
- it should be comprehensible for the decision-makers and/or interest groups; 
- it should be able to employ all available data in an efficiënt way 
(including 'soft' or qualitative data); 
- it should, beside efficiency criteria, take into account equity and/or 
other relevant social distribution criteria; 
- it should pay attention to conflicts among objectives,(interest)groups 
or other subsystems of the entire system; 
- it should try to assess trade-offs among different policy objectives; 
(by weighting procedures, e.g.); 
- it should leave possibilities for a learning strategy and feedback 
mechanisms in an (interactive) planning approach; 
- it should be able to provide an integrated and systematic picture of all 
interactions and effects within the system at hand; 
- it should open ways for compromise policies in case of policy conflicts; 
- it should try to take take account of the institutional structure of 
decis,ions in the existing policy framework; 
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- it should try to formulate a meaningful decision space for achieving 
a satisfactory solution, based on either optimizer of satisficer 
principles. 
All these criteria will of course never entirely be satisfied, but it will 
be shown in the next section that models for policy analysis can be designed 
that fulfil many of the abovementioned criteria. 
Models for Policy Analysis 
A model usually provides a stylized picture of a part of a complex reality. 
Clearly, models in a policy analysis should be able to indicate the 
boundaries within which policy decisions are to be made, the trade-offs 
inherent in choosing altemative solutions, the impacts of policy measures 
on a (normally large) set of policy objectives, and the possibilities for 
an interplay between experts and policy-makers. 
Usually such a model is composed of a set of mathematical equations 
describing the functioning of the system (cf. Tinbergen, 1956), but this 
is not always necessary. Even impact systems and graph-theoretic representa-
tions might provide useful information (see Blommestein and Nijkamp, 1981), 
while also soft information can be meaningfully taken into account by means 
of soft econometrie models (see Nijkamp and Rietveld, 1981). 
Suppose now the following formal structural model containing a vector of 
decision variables z_ (instruments, e.g.), of policy objectives w (with 
elements w. , i = 1, ..., I), of endogenous variables _x, and of endogenous 
or predetermined data v : 
JL (£> H.» —> Z) ~ 2. O 
Then the following reduced form for the objectives may be assumed : 
w = g U, v) (2) 
Furthermore, a set of constraints (technical, social, political, economie, 
etc.) on the control variables of the system may be specified : 
z_ £ K (3) 
where K represents a feasible area. Then an efficiënt (non-dominated or 
Pareto-optimal) solution may be defined as follows : z_ £ K is efficiënt, 
if no z * £ K does exist, such that : 
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ü * = 1 (£ * » Z) rl — (̂ ) 
and : 
wi* " Si <£ * » X> > wi i € { l 1} (5) 
Thus, an efficiënt solution implies that no other feasible policy exists, 
which is for all policy criteria at least equally good and for at least 
one criterion better (cf. Despontin, 1980). Normally, one may expect that 
any good policy should be an efficiënt solution (although sometimes - due 
to political reasons or uncertainties - also non-efficient solutions are 
being chosen; cf. Leibenstein, 1976). 
In general, a meaningful policy analysis should focus the attention in 
particular on the efficiency frontier (i.e. the set of efficiënt solutions) 
in order to identify a policy that will not be dominated by other policies. 
This is especially important in the framework of interactive policy models 
which usually aim at finding a compromise solution located on the efficiency 
frontier. This will be discussed later. 
Policy Objectives 
The exposition in the foregoing section was based on the assumption that 
policy objectives can easily be identified and are given prior, to the 
actual use of the model. In reality, however, neither the analysts nor 
the decision-makers have a perfect insight into the various objectives to 
be considered as relevant aims in a policy analysis. Clearly, official 
reports or documents of policy-makers may give some indications concerning 
objectives to be reached, but these are often defined in a fuzzy or 
unstructured way, so that they leave open many interpretations (especially 
when general objectives have to be translated into operational policy 
criteria). Moreover, during the process of policy analysis itself, new 
insights are obtained which may lead to reorientation and respecification 
of policy aims and/or criteria. Of course, it might, in principle, be possible 
to include policy aims as 'hard' constraints, but this runs the risk of 
excluding policy flexibility from the model. Consequently, it is recommendable 
to include policy aims - whenever possible - in the form of objective 
functions instead of constraints. 
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The choice and specification of objective functions are evidently a 
matter of political responsibility of decision-makers, but they are 
usually also co-determined by interests of other groups implying also 
conflicts among objectives % conflict analysis is an essential ingre-
diënt of policy analysis. Muitiobjeetive decision theory appears to 
provide a meaningful framework for taking account of conflicts among 
multiple objectives. 
Furthermore, whenever possible, the policy objectives taken into consid-
eration should not only refer to traditional welfare indicators (such as 
income or employment), but should also pay attention to 'soft' social or 
environmental indicators, so that the policy analysis at hand is based 
on a broad and balanced spectrum of policy issues and considerations. 
In this respect, a policy analysis may contribute substantially to gain-
ing also more insight into the political feasibility of compromise Solu-
tions, especially in the framework of an interactive policy approach with 
multiple objectives. This will be discussed in the next section. 
Interactive Policy Models 
Interactive policy models take for granted that many problems in a policy 
analysis do not require an unambigious solution that represents once and 
for all the optimal state of the system concerned. 
In light of the process character of many planning problems, an interac-
tive policy analysis is certainly a reasonable approach. This approach is 
usually composed of a series of steps based on a systematic exchange of In-
formation between decision-makers and analysts (or experts). These inter-
active approaches have normally two steps in common: 
- the analysts provide meaningful information and propose feasible trial 
solutions on the basis of a well defined compromise procedure; 
the decision-makers respond to each trial solution by indicating in 
which direction (i.e., in regard to which effects) the proposed compro-
mise is still unsatisfactory. 
These steps of an interactive policy procedure can be successively repeated, 
until after a series of steps a final satisfactory compromise solution has 
been identified. Recently, a large number of interactive models has been 
developed (see, for a study, among others, Rietveld, 1980 and Spronk, 1981). 
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Such interactive policy models which have already demonstrated their use-
fulness on several occasions have many significant advantages compared to 
traditional single-objective optimization methods : 
they are in agreement with the process character of the majority of 
current planning problems ; 
they are built on learning principles and feedback mechanisms for 
decision-makers; 
- they provide necessary and meaningful information in a systematic and 
stepwise way; 
- they take into account the limited capability of the human mind to judge 
complex planning problems with many choice options in one step; 
they emphasize the active role of decision-makers in specifying and solv-
ing choice problems, inter alia by making policy objectives more explicit 
and measurable; 
they are able to take account of the variety and the conflicting nature 
of policy options or decision criteria in planning problems; 
they allow an assessment of (implicit or explicit) trade-offs in many 
choice situations, without necessarily requiring a quantitative specifi-
cation of weights; 
they provide an integrative framework for choosing consistent compromise 
solutions in complex and conflicting decision situations; 
they may be used to eliminate successively less relevant alternative choice 
options (for instance, by a dominance or strength-weakness analysis); 
they may fit into an institutional structure characterized by multiple 
decision-makers, various decision levels or long-lasting planning proce-
dures . 
In conclusion, interactive policy models may provide a coherent, operational 
and systematic contribution to a scientific rationalization of complex policy 
problems in reality. In the next paragraph, more explicit attention will be 
devoted to one of the recently developed interactive policy models, viz. 
interactive multiple goal programming. 
6, Interactive Multiple Goal Programming (IMGP) 
Suppose the following multiple goal programming problem: 
max g. (x) V i 
subject to Ax >^ b̂  > 
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where 2E. -*-s a vector of instrumental variables (see also (2)). There 
is a wide variety of methods dealing with such problems. 
One of the methods for dealing with multiple goal functions is interactive 
multiple goal programming (IMGP) (see Nijkamp and Spronk, 1980, and Spronk, 
1981). 
The basic idea of IMGP is, that the decision-maker provides information 
about the desired state of the system on the basis of a provisional solu-
tion and a potency matrix presented to him. The potency matrix is made up 
by 2 vectors, representing respectively the pessimistic and ideal solution. 
For each goal variable separately, the pessimistic solution represents a 
minimum acceptable value (usually proposed by the decision-maker), whereas 
the ideal solution represents the individual maximum values, given the pessi-
mistic solution. The decision-maker has to indicate whether or not a solu-
tion is satisfactory to him. If he judges a solution as unsatisfactory, he 
has to indicate which of the minimum goal values should be increased in 
value. Next, a new solution is presented to him together with a new poten-
cy matrix. The decision-maker has to indicate whether the shifts in the 
proposed (trial) solution are outweighted by the corresponding shifts in the 
potency matrix. If not, again a new trial solution is calculated and so 
forth, until a satisfactory solution has been found. 
For the ease of presentation, the method is here described by assuming that 
in each iteration only one element of the solution may alter. A generaliza-
tion to more elements is straightforward, however. 
Step 1 
Maximize each individual variable g. (x) ; denote the maximum by g? and 
the I resulting values of the instrumental variables by x_*,i=l,...,I. 
It will never be possible to find a feasible value of g. (x) that exceeds 
g? . Generally, it is not necessary to accept a value of g. (x) which is 
lower than g. , defined as follows: 
g™ = min {gj:(x *)} , j = 1, ..., I (7) 
j 
This is the lowest value of g. (x) resulting from the successive maximi-
zations of all individual goal variables. Next, the final solution S* 
must be located between the 'ideal' (but normally unfeasible) solution I , 
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and the 'pessimistic' solution Q . These solutions are respectively 
defined as; 
•*• Lg, j g~ s • • • » S T J 
m m m m min, 
Q = Lgj » S2 » •••» gj J 
and 
(8) 
To facilitate the notation we have mcluded the ideal solution I and the 
pessimistic solution Q in a (2x1) potency matrix P . 
Step 2 
Define for all j = 1, ... ,1 the following discrepancy value : 
V ij - «f <9> 
Step 3 
Define the initial solution as follows: 
r min min min-, ,,_. 
Sj = [gj , g2 , ..., g-,- J (10) 
which is thus equal to the pessimistic solution defined in (8). 
Present the latter solution together with the potency matrix P1 to the 
decision-maker. 
Step 4 
If the proposed solution satisfies the decision-maker, one may terminate 
the procedure; otherwise, define R. as the subset of R defined by the 
goal levels in S. , and proceed to step 5. 
Step 5 
The decision-maker has to answer the question : 'Given the provisional 
solution S. , which goal variable should first be improved?' He needï 
not indicate himself how much this goal variable should be increased. 
10 
Step 6 
Assume that the decision-maker wants to increase the j-th goal variable 
in value. Construct then a new trial solution S. , , which differs from 
S. only in the value of the j-th goal variable (denoted by g.(x) £ 
1+1 
and g.(x) respectively). Next one may define: 
J ^ 
8j <£>i. , = Sj <ï>s.
 + * 6j ' <"> 
J ï+l J ï J 
foliowed by introducing the following restriction: 
g. (x) > g. (x)~ (12) 
J J bi+l 
Step 7 
Combine the restriction described in step 6 (or in step 9) with the set 
of restrictions describing the feasible region R. . Calculate a new 
potency matrix, like in step 2, but subject to the new set of restrictions. 
Denote this potency matrix by P-, , • 
Step 8 
Confront next the decision-maker with S. and S. , on the one hand, and 
ï i + l 
with P. and P. . on the other hand. The shifts in the potency matrix 
ï i + l f J 
can be viewed as a 'sacrifice' trade-off for reaching the proposed trial 
solution. IJ_ the decision-maker judges this sacrifice to be reasonable, 
accept then the proposed solution by putting S. , = S... and P. , = P. , r i- t- J t- ö i+l ï+l ï+l ï+l 
and specify: 6. - 56. . Continue with step 4. I_f_ the decision-maker 
regards the sacrifice as unjustified, the proposed initial value of g. (x) 
is obviously too high. 
In that case, one may drop the constraint added in step 7. 
Step 9 
Now we know that g. (x)c is too low and that g. (x)^ is too high 
J i . J ~ i+1 
in the decision-maker's view. 
Set then 6. equal to the difference between these two values. Then a new 
J 
proposal value S. , is calculated according to (11). 
ï+l 
Like in step 6, we add the restriction that g. (x) must equal or exceed 
the new proposal value, and proceed to step 7. 
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A flow chart of the IMGP procedure is given in Figure 1. The method is 
entirely operational and has been used in various real-world planning 
problems . For further details on IMGP (inclusion of aspiration levels, 
etc.) the reader is inferred to Nijkamp and Spronk (1980) and Spronk (1981), 
Remove from the 
list in (2) al l 
aspirationlevels 
that have become 
unattainable. 
Define 
Si + 1"Si + 1 
P i + l-='
Pi + 1 




Identify the inttrumsnts, the goal 
variables and the foosible reglon. 
Collect o priori information about 
the decision maker'] preferonces, 
Define 6 ; for j = l , . . . ,m. That is, 
if for a given goal variable j no 
aspiration level has been defined, 
set 6; = g * ; - g : m i n . Ofherwise, 
set $j = 0 . 
I Present the storting solution S] and 
the potency matrix P] to the decision 
maker. 
Let the decision maker indicate which 
goal variables should be ougmented. 
Calculate the proposal solution | ; + j . 
If g:(x) should be augmented, the 
value of 5: is important. If 6 i = 0 , 
the a priori information in (2) is used. 
If 6 : > 0,a:(x)« = 9 i ( ï ) c + i - S ; 
Calculate the potency matrix P| + j ? 
|Calculate the potency matrix P ] . | 




Does the decision maker consider the 
change from £; to S; + ] to be acceptablc 
to justify the change from P; to Pj + ^ ? 
I Let the decision maker indicate which 
of the justly changed goal values should 
be reduced. 
For all j , for wich the proposal 
value g:(x)> must be reduced, 
1 " - i + 1 
define fi. -g . {x )g - g ; ( x ) s 
1 I 3i + l ' i\ 
and redefine 
Figure 1. Flow chart of the interactive procedure. 
The authors acknowledge the stimulating co-operation with Professor 
J.A. Hartog during the computerization and implementation phase of 
this interactive method. 
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Illustration ; A Model for Western Europe 
The use of IMGP will be clarified by presenting some results from an 
integrated economic-environmental model. The model used in this empiri-
cal illustration was designed for a major industrial heartland in Western 
Europe, made up by the areas The Netherlands, Belgium, Nordrhein-Westfalen 
and France Nord, by Van Driel et al. (1980). This part of Western Europe 
contains approx. 45 million inhabitants in an area of 115,000 square kilo-
meters. In this industrialized and densely populated area, various con-
flicting options regarding economie growth, environmental conditions and 
energy availability are most likely to emerge and have led to serious 
frictions in the past. 
Van Driel et al. (1980) have developed a dynamic economie sectoral model 
based on an input-output framework. The description of this model will not 
be repeated here, but only some general features will be outlined. 
The number of industrial sectors in this model was 17 (see Table 3). The 
structure of this input-output model, formulated as an inequality condition, 
is: 
£ t > (
A+D) S.t
 + K (*t+1 " ™t)
 + Y-t ' (O 
where: 
a = vector of sectoral production levels in year t 
w = production capacity in year t 
y_ = final demand and export surplus in year t 
A = matrix of Leontief input-output coefficients 
D = matrix with sectoral depreciation coefficients for capital 
K = matrix of sectoral capital coefficients . 
Clearly, the following condition holds: 
x < w. (2) 
—t — —t 
This basie model has been extended with both a pollution model describing 
the emission of 4 kinds of pollutants (waste water, sulphur dioxide, solid 
waste, and pollution from cars) and a corresponding pollution abatement 
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technology . In addition, the dynamic input-output model was completed 
by means of capital and depreciation coefficients based on a so-called 
vintage model. The model does not contain straightforward behavioural 
equations; instead, policy options have been formulated in the form of 
inequalities, for instance, regarding productive capacity (i.e., the 
capital stock) and environmental pollution. The planning horizon of the 
model was supposed to be 10 years. After the specification of an appro-
priate objective function, this model can be treated as either a year-to-
year programming model or a 10-year model. This model has been used as 
a framework for an interactive policy analysis set out in the previous 
paragraphs. 
The experiments with this interactive model were induced by a project of 
the Dutch Scientific Council for Public Policy (abbreviated as WRR; see 
WRR, 1980). Consequently, the above mentioned IMGP approach was chosen 
as a tooi for obtaining more insight into the conflictive nature of dif-
ferent policy objectives, the feasibility of certain economie policy 
scenarios, and the (in)stability of the results of the model for alterna-
tive policy variants. This Council also provided the information on policy 
objectives, constraints and various scenarios. 
After a long discussion, six goal variables have ultimately been selected 
for an interactive policy analysis according to the above mentioned approach. 
I, employment : maximization of the total wage sum over the planning 
horizon; 
II. growth : minimization of the difference between the actual 
growth rate of production and a 3 per cent annual 
target growth rate of production; 
III. environmental 
quality : minimization of pollution by introducing a desired 
negative growth path for each pollutant (varying 
from 5 to 10 per cent); 
IV. balance-of-
payment : minimization of the maximum change in export surplus 
compared to a base year for each sector separately; 
V. overall equi-
librium on . . . ,. _, ^ _ , , ... . ^ ,̂ 
, , n : minimization of the total deficit over the entire the balance-
of-payment planning period; 
1) In fact, the pollution coefficients for a sector were expressed as the 
abatement costs per unit of production value of the sector concerned. 
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VI. stability of minimization of the maximum annual decrease (or 
consumption ••*.- £ ..u • • •, • s r , maximization of the minimum annual increase) for each pattern : 
sector. 
Apart from these goal variables some specific policy constraints have 
been introduced: 
a. The annual change of the production level in the conventional 
sectors was allowed to fluctuate between a maximum annual decrease 
of 5% and a maximum annual increase of 10%. 
b. The annual growth of the total consumption level should equal or 
exceed 1 percent per year. Given the expected growth in population, 
this is a necessary condition to maintain the per capita consumption 
level. 
On the basis of this set of 6 objective functions and policy constraints, 
a series of experiments with interactive policy strategies has been carried 
out in the framework of the above mentioned WRR study. Some results of this 
IMGP approach will be described in the next section. 
Experiments with the Interactive Policy Model 
In recent years, multiple criteria decision methods have been employed as 
usefool tools in various integrated planning models in Western Europe (see 
Despontin, 1980 and Hartog et al., 1980, for overviews). Various experi-
ments with a small scale version of the model described in the preceding 
section were carried out prior to the implementation of the complete model. 
As a first start of the interactive policy analysis, a fully operational 
version of this (simplified) interactive policy model was demonstrated to 
various experts and decision-makers in government and industry. It appeared 
that two main conclusions could be drawn from these initial deomonstrations: 
first, both experts and decision-makers regarded the interactive framework 
as a useful decision aid, among others because of the induced learning ef-
fects; secondly, as the input-output model proposed by Van Driel et al. 
(1980; see the preceding section) does not include any behavioural relation-
ship, clearly the results depend only on the technical relations, the added 
side-conditions and the decision-maker's evaluations. These technical 
relationships and constraints are rather 'hard' and reflect the maximum 
permissible state of the system, so that one may conclude that - if a cer-
tain combination of the objectives is not feasible within the model - this 
combination is certainly not feasible in the real world. 
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On the other hand, if a certain combination of objectives turns out to 
be feasible within the model, it is not certain - because of the omitted 
behavioural relationships - that this combination can be realized in prac-
tice. In summary, the results obtained by means of this interactive policy 
model are rather hard, at least stated in a negative sense ('falsification'). 
The first experiments with the small—scale version of the model proved al-
ready the usefulness and operationality of the IMGP approach. More details 
of the above mentioned small version of the model are given by Hartog et al., 
1980. 
Next, on the basis of these experiments the Dutch Scientific Council for 
Public Policy (WRR) decided to implement the IMGP procedure in combination 
with the complete version of the Western Europe model described in the 
preceding section. Because this project had to be carried out within a 
limited time period and because the experiences with interactive procedures 
were not yet related to large scale models, the results of the experiments 
were not as satisfactory as they could have been under ideal circumstances 
(see Hartog and Spronk, 1980, and WRR, 1980, for details). 
Nevertheless, the results were judged to be very instructive. Besides, 
several conclusions could be drawn which turned out to be helfjful in new 
experiments with interactive modelling (for instance, a new study of the 
WRR uses an adapted version of the above mentioned methodology). Hereafter, 
we will present part of the results of the above mentioned experiments, 
foliowed by the description of some lessons learned from them in the follow-
ing section. 
In Table 1, the successive sets of limit goal values ('pessimistic' solutions), 
subject to which each goal variable had to be optimized separately at each 
iteration, are given. All figures represent billions of Dutch guilders (1965), 
except those related to the third goal variable which is measured in per-
centages. Because in the first iteration the unconditional optimal solutions 
are calculated, initially no pessimistic goal values are given. Until the 
fifth iteration, no pessimistic goal value is given for goal variable 6, 
because until this very iteration it was provisionally (but after all un-
correctly) assumed that the balance-of-payment deficit could be decreased 
implicitly by means of the other goal variables. In fact, awareness of 
this mistake can be considered to be one of the learning effects obtained 
by using the interactive policy model. 
Table 1. Sets of limits on the goal variables 
goal variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
employment 1 300 350 350 350 350 350 
deviation from 
growth target 2 19 10 10 10 10 10 
deviation from 
pollution decrease 
target 3 50 25 25 25 15 5 
maximum change 
in sectoral 
export-surplus 4 16 5 ! 1 1 1 
total balance-
of-payment 




consumption 6 - - - 10 10 10 
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More interesting than the pessimistic goal values are the optimal values 
which cara be obtained by taking account of the pessimistic goal values. 
In Table 2, three examples are given. The set of goal values A is ob-
tained when the first goal variable is maximized in the 10-th iteration sub-
ject to the corresponding set of limits in Table 1. The set of goal values 
B is obtained when the 6-th goal variable is minimized in iteration 7 
and set C is obtained when the third goal variable is minimized in the 
7-th iteration. 








513 439 350 
10 10 10 
5 5 4 . 6 
1 1 1 
5 10 0 
0 .1 0 . 33 0.23 
The decision-makers were not only interested in the values of the goal 
variables, but also (and maybe even more) in the values of the instrumental 
variables. In other words, they wanted to know by means of which sectoral 
structure of the industry the chosen combination of goal variables could be 
reached. To illustrate this for the three sets of goal variables A, B and 
C (presented in Table 2), the average rate of change in the annual level of 
production of each of the industrial sectors is given in Table 3. 
For a much more detailed report of these results we refer to WRR (1980). 
Here, it should be stressed that - given the pessimistic goal values in iter-
ation 10 - still many alternatives are feasible. These remaining alternatives 
were not studied in greater detail in this study. This was partly due to 
the limited time available for the study. However, a much more important 
reason was that the obtained results had given new insights to both experts 
and decision-makers. It was feit that new restrictions should be added to 
the model and that some of the goal variables should be reformulated. 
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Table 3. Average annual rate of change (in %) of the sectoral production 
levels * 
set of goal values A B C 
1. Agriculture 0.5 7.2 -4.7 
2. Energy 6.4 1.3 0.8 
3. Ores 8.7 0.3 -2.4 
4. Minerals 9.0 7.4 -0.4 
5. Chemical products 8.4 6.8 -3.6 
6. Metal 9.0 4.7 5.3 
7. Means of transport 8.4 5.3 4.0 
8. Foods 6.1 6.7 -3.3 
9. Textiles 8.4 8.4 3.1 
10. Paper 8.4 8.4 -3.6 
11. Various products 9.0 9.0 -5.0 
12. Building 9.0 -3.0 -0.4 
13. Commerce 9.0 5.8 -1.1 
14. Transport 9.0 6.0 3.5 
15. Money affairs 9.0 2.7 4.3 
16. Other market services -1.8 -5.1 -3.6 
17. Administration 7.3 -0.5 1.3 
Especially the formulation of the second goal variable, viz. growth of 
production, turned out to be inadequate. First, it appears to be not 
clear why, a priori, a growth rate of exactly 3 per cent should be aimed 
at. Secondly, no difference was made between the directions of the devi-
ations from this growth rate : both positive and negative deviations had 
to be minimized in the original policy formulation of the decision-makers. 
The outcomes did also suggest that different formulations of goal variables 
which are defined in terms of growth paths may give rise to very different 
results. For instance, the first (simplified) study had shown that - within 
the framework of the model - the desired environmental quality can be reached 
without any problem, whereas the second more complete study showed that the 
Sources: WRR, 1980, p. 158. 
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choice of the time path, along with the desired environmental quality 
should be reached, is more restrictive for the economie system. 
Furthermore, within a 10-period policy model incorporating many sectors, 
the number of goal variables tends to become unmanageable. 
Therefore, some of the goal variables were formulated in a minimax sense, 
i.e. as the maximum deviation (to be minimized) from a target growth path. 
In principle, all these deviations may be scaled in different dimensions. 
Thus many different ways to handle the problem of large numbers of goal 
variables do exist, which are not yet studied in fuil detail. The sensitiv-
ity of results for alternative numbers or specifications of objectives is 
no doubt a study area that deserves much attention in policy analyses. 
Lessons 
The above mentioned IMGP model has provided many highly interesting experi-
ences with integrated complex planning problems, so that several important 
lessons can be drawn. The main conclusion is that interactive policy models 
can be an important and operational decision aid for the practice of policy-
making and conflict management. It should be stressed that the primary 
purpose of these models is not to provide 'good' or even 'optimal' solutions 
(although formally speaking, this kind of solutions can be provided by these 
models), but that the major advantage of these models is that they can be an 
important learning tooi, for both decision-makers and experts. 
This is especially true because in practice very often no exact goal defini-
tions doexist. Interactive policy models can help to define the decision-
maker's goals more explicitly and to induce an awareness of interdependen-
cies in complex systems. 
Furthermore, as it is not always easy to identify the decision-maker(s), 
interactive policy models may serve as a flexible means of communication 
in an institutional policy setting with many interest and decision groups. 
- 20 -
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